Abstract-Large-scale infrastructures are critical to economic and social development, and hence their continued performance and security are of high national importance. Such an infrastructure often is a system of systems, and its functionality critically depends on the inherent robustness of its constituent systems and its defense strategy for countering attacks. Additionally, interdependencies between the systems play another critical role in determining the infrastructure robustness specified by its survival probability. In this paper, we develop gametheoretic models between a defender and an attacker for a generic system of systems using inherent parameters and conditional survival probabilities that characterize the interdependencies. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions for the cases of interdependent and independent systems of systems under sum-form utility functions. We derive expressions for the infrastructure survival probability that capture its dependence on cost and system parameters, and also on dependencies that are specified by conditional probabilities. We apply the results to cyber-physical systems which show the effects on system survival probability due to defense and attack intensities, inherent robustness, unit cost, target valuation, and interdependencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale infrastructures such as energy, communications, transportation, and oil and gas, are critical to national economic and social development. They are required to provide persistent functionality, and hence their continued performance and security are of high national importance. The functionality of these infrastructures relies on multiple factors, including defense strategies against malicious attacks [1] , [2] , [3] , interdependencies between the constituent systems [4] , [5] as well as their individual system robustness parameters. Typically, these infrastructures have a large number of components that are interdependent on each other due to geographical, functional, or physical factors [6] . A System of Systems (SoS) is an abstraction of such infrastructures with interdependencies between the constituent systems [7] , [8] .
Each individual system contributes to the infrastructure on its own and combined with others such that the joint contribution determines the infrastructure functionality. The interdependencies between constituent systems has been studied in multiple disciplines, and most are linearized methodologies which are favorable for computation and experiment validation, such as Leontief inputoutput model [9] , [10] .
To understand the interdependencies between the constituent systems and their effect on infrastructure performance, we utilize its probability of survival P I as a measure of its functionality, which is referred to as its robustness. Let P i represent the survival probability of constituent system S i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, which consists of n i discrete components. We consider independent and interdependent cases; in the former "benefits" of constituent systems are linearly weighted by P i 's, whereas in the latter they are combined using a generic function.
Since a robust infrastructure is expected to survive malicious attacks, an optimal defense strategy needs to account for attacker's knowledge and approach reflected in the attack strategy. This paper discusses the defense strategy based game theory using an SoS abstraction [11] , [12] . In particular, we develop game-theoretic models between a defender and an attacker for a generic system of systems using the inherent robustness parameters of constituent systems, and interdependencies between them characterized by conditional probabilities. For system S i , let s i denote a scalar parameter representing its inherent robustness, and x i and z i denote the defense and attack efforts, respectively. Using sum-form utility functions, we formulate a simultaneous game between an attacker and a defender, and derive Nash Equilibrium conditions for the cases of interdependent and independent SoS. We derive expressions for P I that capture the dependence on costs and inherent parameters. We apply this approach to cyber-physical systems and obtain detailed expression that show the relationship between the interdependencies and system functionality, and also the effects of defense and attack intensities, inherent robustness parameters, unit cost, target valuation, and interdependencies.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly describes related work and places the present formulation in a broader context. Section III describes a simultaneous game model that considers a generic form for interdependencies between systems using the context success functions. Section IV presents defense strategies for SoS with independent systems also using the contest success functions. Section V shows an application of the proposed approach to a class of cyber-physical systems. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Infrastructures are critical to economy and society, and developing robust and resilient infrastructures is a challenging task since it typically involves taking into account the uncertain natural and man-made hazards. Game theory has been used to strategically defend infrastructures in the face of rational attackers by mathematically modeling the interactions between defender and attacker [13] , [14] , [15] . Different game models including continuous and discrete models, complete and incomplete information games, sequential and simultaneous games have been developed [11] , [16] . A comprehensive review of recent defender and attacker game models can be found in [17] . Recently, game theory is proven to be a viable approach to study cyber security problems [15] , [18] , for example, securing cyber-physical networks [19] with applications to power grids [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . Some game models incorporate robustness and reliability measures [13] for infrastructures such as power grids, cloud computing and transportation systems. In particular, discrete models of sequential game for defense of cyber-physical infrastructures have been studied in various forms [24] . Other related research includes the games between interdependent defenders and its effect on security policies [25] .
The system of systems approach has been used to develop robust and resilient infrastructures such as power grids, cloud computing, transportation, and telecommunication [26] , [27] . The interdependency between systems in terms of physical, geographical, and functional correlations plays an important role in the functionality of SoS. For example, in smart grids, the communication network that connects the constituent systems of cyber and physical components plays a very critical role [20] , in some ways more so than the constituent systems.
The failure of communication network can significantly degrade the entire infrastructure [6] , [28] . Therefore, the defense strategy in response to adversary attacks should consider not only the rationality of attacker but also the interdependencies in the SoS.
One group of game models using the number of cyber and physical components that are attacked and reinforced as the decision variables have been studied in [29] . These models characterize infrastructures with a large number of components, and conditional functionalities between all components. Various forms of correlation functions [3] , [29] , [30] have been used to capture the interdependencies between the survival probabilities of constituent systems, such as the cyber and physical sub-infrastructures. Complex interactions of defense and attack on dependent systems have been studied using game-theoretic formulations and Markov analysis in [31] , [32] , and the pair-level and aggregatedlevel dependencies have been studied using the sum-form utility functions in [3] and the product-form disutility functions in [30] .
In this paper, simultaneous game models with sumform utility of SoS with general interdependencies between constituent systems and system's inherent robustness are developed and analyzed.
III. INTERDEPENDENT SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
The robustness of the infrastructure P I (x, z, s) is a function of defense x, attack z, and inherent robustness parameters s, and also depends on P i 's in a generic form.
A. Conditional Survival Probabilities
The dependence of P I on P i can be formulated as follows.
where Pī is the failure probability of system i, P I|i is SoS survival probability given the survival of system i, and P I|ī is the SoS survival probability given that system i completely failed. It is noticed that the system functionality can be determined by functionality of one system, specifically, the impact of its failure, the functionality of system itself, and the impact difference between SoS functionalities under its survival and failure conditions. Assume that defense effort x i , inherent robustness s i , and attack effort z i of a completely failed system i will not affect the functionality of the SoS, i.e.,
Here the rationality assumption of defender and attacker gives that
In other words, the defense effort and inherent robustness will increase the functionality of the system. Meanwhile, the attack effort will decrease the functionality of the system functionality. When the functionality of a system depends not only on its defense, inherent robustness, and received attack but also on other systems, the system functionality P I is a generic function of P i 's.
Remarks:
1. The marginal contribution of a system defense to SoS functionality increases as the difference between conditional functionalities of SoS given the system survival and failure increases; increases as the marginal SoS conditional functionality (given the system survival) w.r.t. system defense increases; also increases as the system functionality and marginal contribution of system defense increase. 2. The marginal contribution of system inherent robustness to SoS functionality increases as the difference between conditional functionalities of SoS given the system survival and failure increases; increases as the marginal SoS conditional functionality (given the system survival) w.r.t. system's inherent robustness increases; also increases as the system functionality and marginal contribution of system's inherent robustness increase. 3. The marginal damage of attack to SoS functionality increases as the difference between conditional functionalities of SoS given the system survival and failure increases; increases as the marginal SoS conditional functionality (given the system survival) w.r.t. attack increases; also increases as the system dis-functionality and marginal damage of system attack increase.
The SoS functionality formula can also be written as follows.
In sum, we have
In other words, the SoS functionality is determined by the average disfunctional impact of all constituent systems, and the weighted impacts difference between survival and failure for all systems. It is noticed that defense or attack on the system with the highest impact will affect SoS functionality the most. We will derive the optimal defense strategy when both defender and attacker target the same system in the following sections.
B. Simultaneous Game Model
A simultaneous game between a defender and an attacker for a SoS can be formulated based on the payoff based on its functionality and the corresponding cost given by
where V I and v I are the defender's and attacker's SoS valuations, respectively;
is the attack cost of system i. At the Nash equilibrium of the game, the following conditions are satisfied:
Further consider the derivation in Section III-A, at Nash equilibrium we have
C. Contest success function for system functionality
Assume SoS functionality is defined by the contest success function form [33] , [34] , in which the effective defense depends on both defense effort and system inherent robustness, i.e., α i x i + β i s i , where α i , β i ∈ [0, 1], then we have
where x i ≥ 0 is the defense effort of system i; z i ≥ 0 is attack effort on system i; s i ≥ 0 is inherent robustness of system i; m xi > 0 and m zi > 0 are defense and attack intensity on system i, respectively. When m xi = m zi = 1, the system functionality turns out to be
Furthermore, we have
If the conditional functionality of SoS w.r.t. system i is a constant, i.e., P I|i = a, it can be shown using Equations 1, 11, 12, and 13 that the SoS functionality can be obtained by a system's defense, attack and inherent robustness at NE, i.e.,
and
In another case, if the conditional functionality of SoS w.r.t. system i is P I|i = ln(x i + s i − z i ), the relationship between system defense, attack, inherent robustness, the system functionality, and the SoS functionality can be obtained using Equations 1, 11, 12, and 13 as follows,
Given the knowledge of system functionality p i and the expected SoS functionality P I , the defense, attack and inherent robustness at NE for each system can be obtained from the above equations.
IV. INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
To explore the proposed game model in full scale and extract insights, we first consider a special SoS class called independent SoS in which P I takes the following linear form
where
In other words, the weight coefficient δ i of constituent system i is defined as the relative ratio of target valuation Vi n j=1 Vj , which depends on the difference between conditional probabilities of SoS given that constituent system i functional and disfunctional.
A. A simultaneous game model
Assume a simultaneous game of complete information between the defender and attacker, we have the following models.
where P i is the successful functionality of system i, and 1 ≤ i ≤ N . At Nash equilibrium, it can be shown that
If all systems are independent with each other, then we can derive from the above equations that the Nash equilibrium solution of defense, attack and inherent robustness satisfy the following equations.
In addition, we have the sufficient condition of existence of NE solution as follows:
Under the system multiplier condition in [35] , there exists λ i such that
ViΛi . This condition is satisfied under the statistical independence and also when contest success functions are used as system functional as described next.
B. Contest function for system functionality
When the system functionality is given by a defenseattack contest success function, P i = αixi+βisi αixi+βisi+zi from Equation 8 , it can be shown using Equations 24, 25, and 26 that
Then we havê
If the defense, attack, and inherent robustness levels; costs of defense, attack, and inherent robustness; and the target valuation of one system are known, the estimate of SoS functionality can be obtained using the above equation.
V. APPLICATION TO CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Consider a large SoS is composed by n systems, and each system has a cyber component and a physical component. When the simultaneous game between a defender and an attacker in Section IV is applied to this cyber-physical system (CPS), the models shown below are followed. 
The functionality of CPS for each component P cipi can be defined using the contest success function as shown below.
At NE, it can be shown using 
We notice that increasing the inherent robustness s ci and s pi can decrease the unit cost of cyber (and physical) defense. Increasing inherent robustness can increase the unit cost of cyber and physical attack (e.g., when
. Counter-intuitively, increasing inherent robustness may decrease the attack cost, given that the denominator
It is also observed that at NE, the unit cost of inherent robustness s ci and s pi should be equal.
Proposition 1: When the defense intensities in cyber and physical spaces are equal, i.e., m xc i = m xp i , (i) If 0 < m xc i = m xp i < 1, in other words, the effectiveness of defense efforts is insignificant, cyber defense x ci decreases in the defense cost ratio of cyber versus physical space
; increases in the physical inherent robustness s pi ; and decreases in the cyber inherent robustness s ci ; physical defense x pi increases in the defense cost ratio of cyber versus physical space
; increases in the cyber inherent robustness s ci ; and decreases in the physical inherent robustness s pi .
(ii) If m xc i = m xp i > 1, in other words, the effectiveness of defense efforts of both spaces is exponentially increasing, cyber defense x ci increases in the defense cost ratio of cyber versus physical space
; increases in the physical inherent robustness s pi , and decreases in the cyber inherent robustness s ci ; physical defense x pi decreases in the defense cost ratio of cyber versus physical space when the cyber attack intensity 0 < m zc i < 1. In particular, when m xc i = m xp i = 1, pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists only when the defense cost in cyber and physical spaces are equal, i.e., C D ci = C D pi . Figure 1 shows the correlation of defense and attack on cyber and physical components at NE, given different defense and attack intensities. When the defense (and attack) intensity on cyber components is higher than that on physical components (m xc = 3, m xp = 2, m zc = 3, m zp = 2) as shown in Figure 1(a) , the defense (and attack) effort on cyber components is higher than defense (and attack) on physical components. The defense on both cyber and physical components are also higher than the attack. It shows that the defender maximizes his utility by defending cyber components when cyber attack level is low considering the high intensity of cyber defense. While the attacker also attacks more on cyber components than physical components since the cyber attack intensity is high. When attack efforts go higher, both defender and attacker invest more on physical components because of the relatively low unit cost of physical attack. Figure 1(b) shows that when the physical defense has a relative high intensity than the cyber defense, and cyber attack has a relatively low intensity than the physical attack (m xc = 3, m xp = 2, m zc = 2, m zp = 3), the defender defends more on physical components when attack level is low; and more on cyber components when attack level goes high. The figure also shows that the cyber attack is high when attack level is low; and the physical attack exceeds cyber attack when high attack level is needed because of the relative low cost of physical attack.
Figure 1(c) shows when the cyber defense has relatively high intensity than physical defense, and physical attack has relative high intensity than cyber attack (m xc = 2, m xp = 3, m zc = 3, m zp = 2), cyber defense is relatively high when attack level is low; and physical defense goes higher than cyber defense when attack level is high because of relatively low physical defense cost.
Figure 1(d) shows that when both physical defense and attack have relatively high intensity (m xc = 2, m xp = 3, m zc = 2, m zp = 3), defense and attack will be more on physical components when attack level is low; and cyber defense exceeds physical defense as the attack level goes high. And cyber attack increases more than physical attack as the attack level increases. Figure 2 shows the variation of inherent robustness 
of cyber and physical components at NE given different defense and attack intensities. When cyber attack intensity (m zc ) is relatively higher than physical attack intensity (m zp ), the total inherent robustness (s c + s p ) is relatively high when physical inherent robustness (s p ) is higher than cyber inherent robustness (s c ). When physical attack intensity is relatively high, the total inherent robustness is high when cyber inherent robustness is higher than physical inherent robustness. Given the same attack intensities on cyber and physical components, the total inherent robustness is higher when cyber defense intensity is higher than physical defense intensity. When cyber intensity is high and unit cyber attack cost is high, attacker will focus on cyber attack when attack level is low, and on physical attack when attack level is high (as shown in Figure 1(b) ). The defender, however, will focus on physical defense when attack level is low, and on cyber defense when the attack level is high. Therefore, high inherent robustness is needed to counter the attack for both cyber and physical components.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated optimal defense strategies for a system of systems considering interdependencies and inherent robustness parameters by developing simultaneous game models between a defender and an attacker. The model solution showed that the SoS functionality is determined by the average disfunctional impact of all systems, and the weighted impact difference between functional and disfunctional for all systems. A general contest success function is used to characterize the SoS functionality, which depends on defense, attack, and inherent robustness parameters. Given the knowledge of a system's functionality, unit defense and attack costs, and target valuations, the SoS functionality, defense, attack, and inherent robustness levels of each system can be obtained using the proposed game-theoretic model. The independent case is also studied when the utility of SoS is given by the sum of constituent systems' utilities, which only depends on the inherent robustness, received attack and defense of the system itself.
The application of the proposed method to cyberphysical systems showed that cyber and physical defense (attack) efforts are determined by costs, and intensity (significance effect) of defense and attack. When both cyber defense and attack have high intensities, the cyber defense level is higher than physical defense when attack level is low. The physical defense exceeds cyber defense when the attack level is high. When cyber defense has high intensity, cyber defense will be higher than physical defense when the attack level is low; and physical defense will be higher than cyber defense when the attack level is high. When both cyber defense and attack have low intensities, with the high cyber attack cost, the physical attack increases in a lower rate than cyber attack as the attack level increases. The inherent robustness analysis at NE shows that when cyber attack intensity is high, invest more on cyber inherent robustness can decrease the total inherent robustness needed. The work in this paper provides insights for practitioners on improving infrastructures robustness. Future research can be focused on extending the model to resilience of SoS using system dynamics analysis and application on real infrastructure systems. 
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